A Critique of Zero-Sum Emotions

Lately I've been engaging in discussions with a friend whose personal philosophy is very different from my own. One of the topics we've discussed is his "zero-sum theory of emotions," which proposes that human emotions arise from changes in motivation and cancel out in the long run. I disagree with his model for several key reasons, which I will now discuss.

I'll start by giving an overview of my friend's system, but in case you want a more detailed look, a post from his blog where he introduces his theory can be found here. My goal is to highlight the major flaws of zero-sum emotions (ZSE) that can be induced from common experience, its inability to explain our higher-level emotions, and its ultimate flaw of leading to a contradiction.

An Overview of Zero-Sum Emotions

Zero-sum emotions attempts to model human emotion in terms of pain and motivation, viewing the former as the experience of a change in the latter. This model has some utility in describing some aspects of human emotions, so to be fair I'll start by exploring the positive characteristics of the model.

The main idea of zero-sum emotions is that emotions are reducible to changes in one's "motivation," which is simply one's desire to act. Pain, used to mean all negative emotion, is the internal experience of increasing motivation, while pleasure is the experience of a decrease in it. Emotions are "zero-sum" because motivation inherently stabilizes, and living in a state of low motivation for an extended period of time is unlikely, if not impossible (such a state would be similar to death). ZSE argues that the way in which motivation gives rise to changes in one's internal state and the fact that consciousness is a "difference detector" means only changes in motivation can be experienced, so one's emotions must add up to 0 in the long run.

Consider some examples from which this model could be induced. The experience of tactile pain from being pricked with a sharp object, say, the thorn of a rose, seems to follow this pattern in many cases. The pain usually comes with a wave of motivation to remove the thorn from one's body, and relief follows one's action in response to the pain. This model is also supported by the experience of hunger and physical pain that comes in waves, suggesting that dull continuous pain might be imperceptible, while alternating waves of pain and relief result in more motivation to act. Finally, it is reasonable to conclude that, in many cases, the pleasure one gains from eating or engaging in sexual activity is proportional to one's desire for them, further supporting this theory.

This is where the positive points for ZSE end. It is clear that the model works well for describing simple biological motivation and pain response, and for this it should be commended. However, it fails to describe even basic day-to-day emotions beyond these physical scenarios and draws general conclusions about motivation that fail to hold up to minimal introspection.

Initial Criticisms

My initial criticisms of ZSE consist of obvious counter-examples from personal experience and flaws in the underlying assumptions of the theory.

First, it is clear there are positive emotional experiences that involve no antecedent negative experience and have no relation to motivation. To exemplify this, consider the following scenario. Let's say I'm in a good mood studying for an exam and I think it would improve my experience to listen to music. In accordance with this thought, I choose a song that produces a positive emotional response. When my study session ends and I stop listening to music, I accept that I have other things to do and my evaluation of the experience is an overall positive. In this example there was a lot of positive emotion, but there is no pain whatsoever and no biological motivation resulting in my choice to listen to music. My emotional state does not "sum to 0" by the end, and there was no negative prompting me to put on a song in the first place. This seems to undermine the model.

A supporter of ZSE might claim that there must have been some imperceptible pain that resulted in my choosing the music in the first place, but this argument is strained. If I was not aware of any negative emotion leading to my choice but I was aware of positive emotions afterward, it's fair to say the negative experience was not comparable in magnitude to the joy of listening to music. Furthermore, the assertion that my enjoyment must have been caused by pain is baseless: it was in fact the anticipation of fulfillment that led me to engage with the music, and not any kind of "frustration" as proposed by ZSE. Desire is usually painless, and is often simply anticipation of a positive experience yet to come.

This points to another flaw of ZSE: the assumption that increasing motivation is inherently painful. Even in cases where the experience of pleasure is entirely the result of desire fulfillment, the assertion that such desire is always painful is unfounded. To support this claim, I direct supporters of ZSE to consider the prevalence of the adult entertainment industry and its use of desire as an amplifier of pleasure and not as a painful experience to be escaped at once. Building again on the example of listening to music, the desire to hear a song is rarely correlated with a negative experience and may instead arise from memories of positive experiences one has had with it in the past. Contrary to the claims of ZSE, increasing motivation is not usually experienced as pain.

Despite its utility in partly describing the mechanism of biological motivation, the assumptions and conclusions of ZSE break down when applied to basic everyday experiences. Moreover, these objections pale in comparison to the key flaw of ZSE: its assertion completely neglects the conceptual aspects of human emotions, and its conclusions contradict its own validity.

The Crucial Flaw

So far the positive and negative aspects of zero-sum emotions have been considered. In order to fully dismiss the model, its overly reductive and self-defeating nature must be exposed.

While emotional experiences involving biological needs prompted by physical stimuli are often simple and mechanistic in their functioning, these emotions do not span the entirety of human experience. The large part of human emotions are reactions to the perception of external or internal events automatically evaluated according to one's accepted premises. This means that one's emotional reactions are not biological primaries, but are instead programmed by the ideas and values one has consciously accepted.

A simple example is how one's philosophical beliefs influence one's emotional reaction to the Atlas statue in front of the Rockefeller building. A socialist well-versed in collectivist economic theory will likely have a strong negative reaction to such a sight, identifying it as a representation of the oppression of the working class by more able individuals. An Objectivist philosopher, on the other hand, having read Atlas Shrugged and believing in the efficacy of human reason and the value of heroism, will feel profoundly uplifted in response to the statue, seeing it as the perfect representation of her values. The emotional reaction experienced by each individual in this situation cannot be reduced to biological motivation and represents the ideas accepted by each person involved, contradicting the premises of ZSE.

Another example can be found by turning to another one of my friend's posts, where he attempts to exemplify his model by describing his emotional experiences during a run (the post can be found here). He describes the run as being freeing, then resulting in physical discomfort when his calves ache and a storm breaks out, and then finally in relief when he returns home and showers. He concludes that it was initial restlessness that motivated him to run and the pleasure he experienced while running was caused by the pain he felt in the process, supposedly supporting his model. 

Upon further examination, this example fails to support ZSE collapses. In reading the scenario, one notices the complete lack of reference to any beliefs or conceptual self-evaluation and the over-emphasis on physical sensations. He describes physical restlessness, the freeing feeling of starting the run, the pain in his calves, and the relief following from his shower, neglecting to mention the actual reason he started the run and his overall emotional evaluation of it. Did he really run just because he felt restless, or was it because he had chosen to value fitness? When his calves began to ache, did he experience it as a negative, or did he take it to mean that he was pushing himself? After returning from his run wet from the rain, did he really evaluate it as being bad, or did he see it as proof of his athletic resolve? These questions highlight crucial aspects of our emotions, yet he completely fails to consider them and their implications for his theory.

Continuing to analyze the example, it is clear how the answers to these questions would undermine ZSE. A positive, goal-oriented individual like myself would have felt positively about everything in this situation, coming out of it with a feeling of triumph in having achieved his values. On the other hand, a very negative person might have been angry at the situation, taking it as proof that his efforts to improve his fitness were doomed to fail. These emotions are not the result of the physical sensations my friend describes, but instead of one's conceptual evaluation of their place in his own life. ZSE fails to account for these differences in emotional responses to the same phenomena.

The failure of ZSE to account for higher-level emotions based on rational premises leads to a contradiction. If ZSE holds, then either our rationally held conceptual beliefs do not control our emotions or we do not control our rationally held conceptual beliefs. These beliefs have been shown to control our emotions, so if ZSE is true, we must not be able to control these beliefs. But then a proponent of ZSE must admit that he is not in control of his rational beliefs, which undermines his ability to claim that he has good reasons to believe ZSE. Thus, if ZSE is true, my friend cannot control the rationality of his thinking that leads to his belief in ZSE, so he has no ability to claim it holds, contradicting the assertion that it does. Thus, ZSE undermines its own conceptual validity. This is the same contradiction entailed in determinism.

Ultimately, ZSE fails to account for the conceptual nature of human consciousness and leads to the conclusion that it is impossible to control whether or not one truly believes in ZSE, which would negate my friend's ability to unyieldingly support it. This proves that ZSE is in conflict with the rational nature of human consciousness, rendering it invalid.

Conclusion

My friend's zero-sum theory of emotions is a good attempt at understanding human emotions from a biological perspective based on legitimate observations. However, it does not hold up to initial scrutiny, and it completely fails to account for the fact that human emotions follow from rationally accepted premises, ultimately leading to a contradiction. While ZSE has some explanatory potential in the realm of basic biological motivation, it fails to explain the bulk of human emotion, and it must be rejected.

I hope my friend reads my criticism and uses it to better understand his model and develop a richer description of human emotions. The key lesson to take away from this critique is that a priori models of phenomena often fail to grasp their true nature and that direct observation and philosophic induction should always lead rational thought.